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I. INTRODUCTION
In recent decades, there has been growing concern over the way in
which animals are treated.' Since the mid-1990s, the number of state laws
aimed at protecting animals has tremendously increased.2 Animal law is
now among the country's fastest growing areas of interest in law schools
and legal practice.' Animal rights groups, such as the Humane Society of
the United States (HSUS) and People for the Ethical Treatment of Ani-
mals (PETA), have enjoyed growing influence and increased membership
as interest in animal welfare issues continues to explode.' An increase in
national media coverage of animal-related stories, such as the dogfighting
scandal involving professional football player Michael Vick or the $12
1. See Wayne Pacelle, Law and Public Policy: Future Directions for the Animal Protec-
tion Movement, 11 ANIMAL L. 1 (2005) (discussing current animal rights movement).
While the humane movement began with the creation of the American Society for the
Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA) in 1866, never has the movement to protect
animals been so large as it is today. Id. See also Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are
Animal Rights?, in ANIMAL RiGirs: CURRENT DEBATES AND) NEw DIRECTIONs 4-5 (Cass
R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (describing how animal rights issues have
shifted from the periphery to the center of political and legal discussion since the early
1990s). See generally Darcie Magnuson, Service Animals in Training and the Law: An Im-
perfect System, 14 SCHOLAR 987 (2012) (examining federal and state legislation for the
protection of service animals).
2. Stephan K. Otto, State Animal Protection Laws: The Next Generation, 11 ANIMAL
L. 131, 132 (2005). By 2005, forty-one states and the District of Columbia had some form
of felony-level laws protecting animals, which was a seventy percent increase from 1993.
Id.
3. Laura Ireland Moore, A Review of Animal Rights: Current Debates and New Direc-
tions, 11 ANIMAL L. 311, 311 (2005) (discussing emergence of animal law in the legal
arena). The emergence is evident in the growing number of animal law courses, textbooks,
and even animal law attorneys. Id. See Kathryn Alfisi, Animal Law, DCBAR (Mar. 2008),
http://www.dcbar.org/for_1awyers/resources/publications/washington_1awyer/march_2008/
animallaw.cfm (describing animal law's movement into the mainstream, resulting in an
increase of animal law classes offered at law schools). According to the Animal Legal
Defense Fund, the number of animal law classes offered in law schools has increased more
than tenfold from 2000 to 2008, with schools now offering at least ninety-one animal law
courses. Id. Such recognition by law schools has helped increase animal law's legitimacy
and increase interest in the field. Id.
4. See Larry Copeland, Animal Rights Groups Pick up Momentum, USA ToDAY,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2008-01-27-animal-activists N.htm (last updated
Jan. 27, 2008) (discussing the growing popularity and impact of animal rights groups, in-
cluding the scrutinization of where to purchase groceries and whether to use a horse-drawn
carriage). David Favre, a law professor at Michigan State University and animal specialist,
asserts that animal rights groups are responsible for bringing awareness to animal rights
issues. Id. Favre credits groups like HSUS and PETA for impacting animal rights interest.
Id.
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million that billionaire Leona Helmsley left to her pet Maltese dog at her
death, has also helped raise awareness of animal rights issues.5
Despite increased public awareness of animal rights issues and the
adoption of animal anti-cruelty statutes in all fifty states, the exploitation
of animals is still widespread, as evidenced by the continued use of fac-
tory farms, puppy mills and dog fighting.' Individuals committed to end-
ing these and other similar practices fall into one of two groups: animal
welfare advocates or animal rights advocates.
Animal welfare advocates desire more stringent anti-cruelty laws.'
They call for the prevention of cruelty and the humane treatment of ani-
mals.' While proponents of animal welfare believe it is permissible for
animals to be used for the benefit of humans, they recognize that with
this responsibility comes certain obligations, such as preventing unneces-
sary suffering and providing essentials like food, shelter, and medical care
to the animals."o With its focus on cruelty prevention, animal welfare
groups enjoy widespread support among civilized nations." A leader in
animal welfare advocacy is the American Society for the Prevention of
5. See Kathryn Alfisi, Animal Law, DCBAR (Mar. 2008), http://www.dcbar.org/
for_1awyers/resources/publ ications/washington_1awyer/march_2008/animal_1aw.cfm (dis-
cussing headline worthy stories relating to animals in 2007); See also Michael Vick: "I
Blame Me," CBS NFws (Aug. 16, 2009, 9:05 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-
18560_162-5231257.html (providing a more detailed discussion of the dog fighting case
against Michael); see also Helmsley Leaves Her Dog $12 Million in Trust, MSNBC (Aug.
29, 2007, 9:15 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20490933/ns/us-news-weirdnews/t/
helmsley-leaves-her-dog-million-trust (discussing Helmsley's $12 million gift to her dog).
6. See Pacelle, supra note 1, at 2 (explaining the achievements and existing problems
in animal welfare). Although there have been advancements in animal welfare protec-
tions, such as anti-cruelty statutes and increased penalties for violations, there is still a
serious animal exploitation problem in today's society. Id. For example, animal research
remains unregulated, and only a handful of laws protect animals raised as food production.
Id.
7. Cass R. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, in ANIMAL Ricarrs: CUR-
RENrT DIBATEs AND NEw DImEc)oNs 4-5 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds.,
2004). See Animal Rights vs Animal Welfare, NCRAOA, http://www.ncraoa.com/ARAW
WhatYouShouldKnow.html (last visited July 29, 2012) (defining Animal Welfare as the
belief in humans' responsibility for the care of animals, and Animal Rights as the equality
of humans and animals through applying human morality and removing domination,
breeding, and eating of animals).
8. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, supra note 7, at 5.
9. Id.
10. Michael Schau, Animal Law Research Guide, 2 BARRY L. Rrv. 147, 148 (2001).
See generally, Darcie Magnuson, Service Animals in Training and the Law: An Imperfect
System, 14 SCHOLAR 987 (2012) (suggesting the rights of service animals should be ex-
panded and protected).
11. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, supra note 7, at 5. Opinion
polls consistently demonstrate public support for the humane treatment of animals, as well
as support for the aggressive punishment of animal abusers. Pamela D. Frasch, Finding
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Cruelty to Animals (ASPCA), an agency that embraces the fight against
animal cruelty.12
Contrarily, and more controversially, animal rights advocates are
against "any and all human 'use' of animals." 3 Animal rights proponents
argue that animals are entitled to their own rights and humans should not
deny to animals the rights that they expect to have for themselves." In
other words, under this approach animals are not ours to eat, wear, ex-
periment on, use for entertainment, abuse, or exploit." PETA, taking
what it describes as an "uncompromising stand on animal rights," is one
of the most prominent animal rights groups to adopt this approach. 6 In
Our Voice: Challenges and Opportunities for the Animal Law Community, 14 ANIMAl L. 1,
2 (2008).
12. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, supra note 7, at 5. The ASPCA
believes that animals are entitled to be subject to humane laws. About Us, ASPCA, http://
www.aspca.org/About-Us (last visited July 29, 2012). The ASPCA, a national animal wel-
fare organization with over one million supporters, is committed "to provid[ing] effective
means for the prevention of cruelty to animals throughout the United States." See id.
(quoting founder Henry Bergh).
13. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, supra note 7, at 5.
14. Why Animal Rights?, PETA, http://www.peta.org/about/why-peta/why-animal-
rights.aspx (last visited July 29, 2012). This approach adopts the philosophy of Jeremy
Bentham, a utilitarian thinker who, when discussing the rights of beings remarked, "The
question is not '[clan they reason?' nor '[clan they talk?' but '[clan they suffer?' Id. See
GARY L. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCTION To ANIMAL RicHrs: YOUR CHILD OR THE DOG?
153 (2000) (explaining that animals have a basic right not to be treated as resources, and
that we should balance human and animal interests).
15. See Uncompromising Stand on Animal Rights, PETA, http://www.peta.orglabout/
why-peta/default.aspx (last visited July 29,2012) (explaining PETA's uncompromising po-
sition on animal rights); Animals Used for Food, PETA, http://www.peta.org/issues/ani-
mals-used-for-food/default2.aspx (last visited July 29, 2012) (providing a variety of reasons
why all humans should adopt a vegan diet in order to prevent animal suffering, including
environmental benefits and doing more to address world hunger); Animals Used for Cloth-
ing, PETA, http://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-for-clothing/default2.aspx (last visited
July 29, 2012) (explaining the graphic nature of creating fur, leather, wool and other exotic
animal skin as clothing, and urging humans to cease wearing those items); Animals Used
for Experimentation, PETA, http://www.peta.org/issues/animals-used-for-experimentation/
default2.aspx (last visited July 29, 2012) (discussing why medical research, classroom biol-
ogy lessons, and food and cosmetic testing on animals must be prohibited); Animals Used
for Entertainment, PETA, http://www.peta.org/issues/Animals-In-Entertainment/de-
fault2.aspx (last visited July 29, 2012) (asserting that animals used in circuses, zoos, marine
parks, television shows, and sporting events suffer as a result of their captivity); Human
Abuse Linked to Cruelty to Animals, PETA, http://www.peta.org/issues/companion-ani-
mals/human-animal-abuse.aspx (last visited July 29, 2012) (explaining that abuse to animals
is often linked to the abuse of humans).
16. Uncompromising Stand on Animal Rights, supra note 15. The Humane Society of
the United States has similar goals as PETA, with a focus on eliminating the use of animals
for entertainment and experimentation. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights,
supra note 7, at 5.
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addition to its commitment to animal rights, PETA is well known for its
headline-grabbing, controversial tactics used to raise awareness of animal
rights issues."
In October 2011, PETA received massive media attention and came
under heavy criticism when it asserted that animals have the right to be
free from slavery and involuntary servitude, as guaranteed by the Thir-
teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution." In the first law-
suit of its kind, PETA claimed that SeaWorld Parks & Entertainment
(hereinafter SeaWorld), a marine life park, violated Section 1 of the Thir-
teenth Amendment by holding five Orcas (also known as killer whales)
captive and forcing them to perform in the park's entertainment shows.' 9
To support its claim, PETA alleged that SeaWorld forcibly took the five
17. See FAQ: Why Does PETA Use Controversial Tactics, PETA, http://www.peta.
org/about/faq/Why-does-PETA-use-controversial-tactics.aspx (last visited July 29, 2012)
(explaining why using controversial tactics is necessary). PETA believes that the only way
to garner media coverage is to use "colorful and controversial" tactics, a method the group
has described as "amazingly successful." Id. See also The 15 Most Offensive PETA Adver-
tisement, BUsIN'ss INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2011), http://www.businessinsider.com/peta-shocking-
controversial-ads-201 1-10 (listing the top fifteen most controversial PETA advertisements).
Some of the most outrageous PETA advertisements include comparing caged animals to
Nazi concentration camps, dressing up as members of the Ku Klux Klan to protest the
Westminster dog show, and making graphic comparisons between women and animals by
having nude females lay in buckets of fake blood, hang from meat hooks, or be beaten to
death for her fur coat. Id. PETA advertisements tend to be very shocking, so much so that
the ads are often banned. Too Hot for the Big Game: PETA's Banned Super Bowl Ads,
PETA, http://www.peta.org/features/too-hot-for-the-big-game.aspx (last visited July 29,
2012). On its website, PETA lists videos of numerous advertisement commercials that
have been banned from appearing on television during the Super Bowl game. Id. Among
the ads that were banned include women in lingerie "getting naughty with vegetables," a
man who cannot sexually perform because he eats meat, and a group of men drinking milk
from women with fake cow udders attached to their breast. Id.
18. David Crary & Julie Watson, PETA Lawsuit Seeks to Expand Animal Rights, As-
SOCIA rED PRESs (Oct. 25, 2011), http://news.yahoo.com/peta-lawsuit-seeks-expand-animal-
rights-222219887.html. Specifically, PETA filed suit against Sea World for allowing slavery
by keeping killer whales in involuntary servitude. Id. Many legal scholars believed that
the likelihood of PETA being successful in its claim against SeaWorld were "slim." Id.
The public was outraged over PETA's claims that whales at SeaWorld are slaves. C.J.
Ciaramella, PETA Draws Flak for Comparing SeaWorld to Slavery, DAILY CALLER (Oct.
31, 2011) http://dailycaller.com/2011/10/31/peta-draws-flak-for-comparing-seaworld-to-slav-
ery/. Many law professors and African-American organizations criticized SeaWorld for
labeling the whales held at SeaWorld as "slaves." Id. Project 21, a national conservative
Black leadership network, commented on the lawsuit, stating that its members were
"amused and appalled" at the comparison of captive whales to human slavery. Id.
19. The Thirteenth Amendment, Section 1 reads: "Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly con-
victed, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction." U.S.
CONs-r. amend. XIII, § 1. PETA filed the suit on behalf of five wild orcas that were cap-
tured and confined at SeaWorld, then forced to perform for SeaWorld's "cruel shows."
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wild Orcas from their natural habitats and held them captive in barren
concrete tanks at two SeaWorld parks.20 While there, the Orcas were
allegedly deprived of their liberty and forced to live in grotesquely unnat-
ural conditions, subjected to artificial insemination for breeding purposes,
and were denied the ability to engage in social and cultural activities ben-
eficial to them."
Because this is a case of first impression, it is worthwhile to briefly
examine the arguments that PETA made in asserting why the Thirteenth
Amendment applies not only to people, but also to animals.2 PETA first
argued that the Thirteenth Amendment prohibition of slavery applies not
only to African slavery (referring to the historical context in which the
amendment was passed), but also to a much broader concept that can
reach "morally unjust conditions of bondage and forced service existing
anywhere in the United States."' Specifically, PETA asserted that Sec-
tion 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment forbids the existence of slavery and
involuntary servitude without any reference to "persons."2 4 As such,
PETA argued that the courts have the power to interpret and expand the
Thirteenth Amendment as necessary, in this case extending its protection
PETA and Orcas Prepare for Grounding Legal Case, PETA, http://www.peta.org/features/
wild-captured-orcas-to-make-legal-history.aspx (last visited July 29, 2012).
20. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 1, Tilikum ex rel. People
for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. SeaWorld Parks & Entm't, No. 11cv2476, 2012 WL
399214 (S.D. Cal. 2012), available at www.animallawcoalition.com/system/files/PETA+
complaint.pdf (alleging SeaWorld denied Orcas the right to live freely in their natural envi-
ronment with their family). PETA alleged that the Orcas suffered from stress, trauma,
boredom, diminished communicative capacities, emotional disturbance, and psychological
distress as a result of their confinement in barren concrete tanks. Id. The size of the tanks,
which were allegedly barely bigger than the orcas themselves, is comparable to a "six- foot-
tall man living on half of a volley ball court." Id.
21. Id. Wild Orcas possess advanced "learning, problem solving and communicative
abilities," typically swim one hundred miles per day, and enjoy a lifespan of sixty to ninety
years. Id. Due to their captivity, however, PETA alleges that the Orcas were denied these
basic characteristics and enjoyed only a fraction of their estimated lifespan, a mere 8.5
years. Id.
22. See Joan Russow, PETA Files Cases Against Sea World Claiming Killer Whales
Treated as Slaves, PEACE, EARTH &JUSTICE NEws (Feb. 7, 2012), http://www.pej.org/html/
modules.php?op=modload&name=News&file=article&sid=9271 (discussing significance of
PETA lawsuit being a case of first impression); see also Complaint, supra note 20 (asserting
the case as being one of first impression, not because law is unclear, but because no one
has chosen to bring such a baseless claim before now).
23. Complaint, supra note 20, at 17.
24. See id. PETA does not go into any detail about the language of the Thirteenth
Amendment beyond pointing out that the amendment lacks the word "persons" in the
text. See id. (noting the limited analysis of the language of Thirteenth Amendment).
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to Orcas.2 5 PETA next argued that the Thirteenth Amendment abolishes
involuntary servitude, which applies to "any state of bondage in this
country, of whatever name or form." 26 PETA claims that at a minimum,
the prohibition of involuntary servitude involves one's right to life, lib-
erty, the ability to labor for his own benefit, and "to be free from physical
subjugation . . . by another." 27
Unfortunately for PETA, the court was not persuaded and the case was
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." In terms of the appli-
cability of the Thirteenth Amendment to animals, the court, after review-
ing the plain and ordinary meaning, historical context, and judicial
interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment, concluded that the amend-
ment applies only to "humans." As such, the Orcas were not afforded
any relief under the Thirteenth Amendment.2 9 Characterizing the terms
"slavery" and "involuntary servitude" as "uniquely human activities," the
court rejected the notion that the Thirteenth Amendment is open to an
expansive interpretation. 3 0 Because of its limited scope, the court rea-
soned that there was no basis for extending the constitutional protections
of the Thirteenth Amendment to nonhumans.
With only one court having decided the issue thus far, the question
remains whether animal rights groups should continue to seek Thirteenth
Amendment protection for animals.3 2 This Note will first discuss the cur-
rent debate between animal rights and animal welfare, examining philo-
25. See id. at 18 (describing why the court has the power to extend the Thirteenth
Amendment to animals, especially Orcas). PETA believes that the United States' constitu-
tional jurisprudence demonstrates that courts have the power to interpret and expand con-
stitutional provisions as it sees necessary. Id. They urged the court to use its power to
expand meaning of Thirteenth Amendment, as it did with other amendments. Id.
26. See id, at 18 (explaining that "involuntary" servitude has broader meaning than
"slavery").
27. See id. (asserting what PETA believes is the minimal coverage under "involuntary
servitude").
28. See Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Sea World
Parks & Entm't, No. 11cv24 76, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15258, at *14-15 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
29. See id.
30. See id. See generally Ragini Tripathi, The H-2B Visa: Is This How We Treat a
Guest?, 11 SCuOLAR 519 (2009) (arguing for a more expansive view of the protection af-
forded by the Thirteenth Amendment); Zoe Elizabeth Lees, Payday Peonage: Thirteenth
Amendment Implications in Payday Lending, 15 SCIHOL.AiR 63 (suggesting that the Thir-
teenth Amendment should protect those forced to constantly work in order to maintain
high interest loans or otherwise risk financial failure).
31. See Tilikum ex rel., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15258, at *14-15.
32. See Jennifer O'Connor, The Case Forever Known as Tilikum v. Sea World, TiHE,
PETA FILES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.peta.org/b/thepetafiles/archive/2012/02/09/the-case-
forever-known-as-tilikum-v-seaworld.aspx (claiming that the dismissal of PETA's lawsuit
does not change the slavery of the Orcas at SeaWorld, and the case was a first step towards
ending the enslavement of all animals).
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sophical arguments as well as practical limitations to adopting each
approach. In the analysis section, this Note will discuss why the protec-
tion of the Thirteenth Amendment against slavery and involuntary servi-
tude is not a right that is afforded to animals.
II. A BRIEF HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF ANIMAL LAW
While the current legal status of animals is the same as it was in the
1800s-that of property-the laws providing protections to animals have
evolved over time." Prior to the mid-1850s, animals were often viewed
as any other piece of personal property, indistinguishable from that of a
shovel.34 Because of society's disinterest in animal welfare during this
time, animal laws focused on only "protect[ing] commercially valuable
property from interference by others, not to protect animals from pain
and suffering."3 1 Such laws prohibited anyone but the owner from caus-
ing harm to the animal; because the animal was the owner's property, he
was free to do as he saw fit.36 As people began to appreciate an animal's
ability to suffer and feel pain, anti-cruelty laws aimed at preventing un-
necessary harm to animals emerged." Fueled in large part by Henry
Bergh, founder of the ASPCA, steps were taken to ensure that anti-cru-
elty laws would be created and enforced." The anti-cruelty statutes
33. See FAVRn, ANIMAL LAW: WILFARH, INTERESTS, AN) RIGHiiT's (2008) (providing
an overview of the historical development of animal law); see also PAUL WAoDAu,
ANIMAL Rioirrs: WHAT EveRYONL NEEDS To KNOW 82 (2011) (describing what "tradi-
tional law" of animals has been).
34. See FAVRE, supra note 33 (describing public sentiment toward animals during first
half of nineteenth century). Animals were so strictly regarded as property that statutes
protecting certain animals revealed a narrow protection for animals like horses, but not
dogs. Id.
35. See id. at 205. Initially during the nineteenth century, laws were inadequate to
protect animals other than those who were commercially valuable property. Id.
36. See id. "A crime was committed only if the harmed animal was owned by some-
one else . . . Therefore, if a person maimed his own animal it would not be a crime." Id.
37. Id. at 204. Specifically, there was an increase in awareness regarding the animal's
capacity for pain and suffering, and an interest in protecting animals from unnecessary
infliction. Id. See also PAUL WALDAU, ANIMAL RIcarrs: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDs TO
KNOW 82 (2011) (noting a possible alternative motive in passing anti-cruelty statutes).
While most people believed anti-cruelty statues were created for the protection of animals,
some philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant, argued that anti-cruelty
statutes were really designed for the benefit of humans. See id. (describing difference
among philosophers over why animal rights should exist). They reasoned that it was neces-
sary to stop people who would hurt animals, because such people would likely attack
humans as well. Id.
38. FAVRIE, supra note 33, at 204-05.
36 [Vol. 15:29
THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT AND ANIMAL RIGHTS
passed in the 1860s and 1870s laid the foundation upon which our current
animal protection laws stand."
Today, every state has some type of anti-cruelty statute that protects
animals from mistreatment.4 0 The widespread adoption of these statutes
is due in large part to the work of animal welfare and animal rights
groups, who devote substantial time and resources to pursuing animal
welfare legislation." For example, the Government Affairs department
of the Humane Society of the United States "tracks, reviews, drafts, com-
ments, lobbies, and testifies on legislation that impacts animals in almost
every state."4 2
While state anti-cruelty laws vary from state to state, the two main ar-
eas that are regulated under these statutes are intentional acts and omis-
sions.4 3 Intentional acts, which usually carry a more severe punishment,
are acts done by a person who knowingly tries to harm an animal." An
omission, or failure to act, is defined differently in each state; most juris-
dictions define "omission" as including the failure to provide an animal
with food, water and shelter.4 s The inclusion of omissions in state animal
laws is a significant advancement from earlier anti-cruelty laws.
39. Id. at 204.
40. See Rebecca F. Wisch, Overview of State Cruelty Laws, ANIMAL LEGAL & Hisr.
C irR (2005), http://www.animallaw.info/articles/ovusstatecrueltylaws.htm (last visited
Feb. 2, 2012) (describing what protections animals have under state law). While these stat-
utes provide protection to animals, they do not grant legal rights. Id.
41. See Pacelle, supra note 1, at 2-3. While the anti-cruelty laws do not afford actual
legal rights to animals, they do provide much needed protection for animals. Id.
42. Past State Legislation: Highlights, TIiE HUMANE Socurry (Jan. 20, 2011), http://
www.humanesociety.orglabout/departments/legislation/state legislation summaryhistory.
html (discussing type of work organization does on legislative matters); see 2011 Accom-
plishments, Ttwt HuMANE SocIETy (Dec. 29, 2011), http://www.humanesociety.orglabout/
overview/2011_accomplishments.html (last visited Feb. 2,2012) (describing the most recent
legislative accomplishments for The Humane Society). In 2011, the HSUS helped pass
nearly ninety new state laws to protect animals and prevented sixty-five harmful bills from
being enacted. Id. These new laws addressed a host of issues, such as dog fighting, shark
fin trading, cockfighting and pet breeding. Id.
43. See Wisch, supra note 40 (discussing what type of actions state anti-cruelty statutes
penalize). Regardless of the type of act, "[ajnti-cruelty statutes only operate in the crimi-
nal system." Id. See also Map of State Cruelty Laws, ANIMAL LEGIAL ANDl HisroRIcAL
CENTE.i http://www.animallaw.info/articles/armpstatecruelty.htm (last visited July 24,
2012) (listing anti-cruelty statutes passed in all fifty states).
44. See Wisch, supra note 40 (explaining what constitutes an intentional act under
anti-cruelty laws). Although most of state anti-cruelty laws are classified as misdemeanor
offenses, heinous acts of animal cruelty, such as mutilation, and repeat offenders can face
felony charges. Id.
45. See id. (explaining what constitutes an omission under state law). In some states,
the failure to provide an animal with necessary medical attention may also be included
under the statute. Id.
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In addition to state laws, the federal government has passed several
major animal protection statutes. 46 Some of the most notable federal
statutes include the Endangered Species Act, Marine Mammal Protection
Act, and the Animal Welfare Act.4 7 While federal protection of animals
is achieved primarily through statutes in the United States,48 in 2002 Ger-
many became the first country in the European Union to grant constitu-
tional protections to animals.4 9
Despite advances in the legal system regarding the treatment of ani-
mals, there are significant limitations to the aforementioned laws.s Be-
cause enforcement of anti-cruelty statues is possible only through public
prosecution, it is up to the states to decide how effectively these laws are
46. See Cass R. Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, in ANIMAL RiGHTs: CURRENT De:IIAT1iS
AND Niw DIRaCIrONs 251, 253 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004)
(describing efforts by federal government to protect animals). Within the last few decades,
there has been an increase in the amount of federal legislation aimed at protecting animals;
currently there are more than fifty federal statutes in place. Id. Currently, there are more
than fifty federal statutes in place. Id. See also Schau, supra note 10, at 153-55 (listing
most important federal animal protection statutes).
47. See Sunstein, supra note 46, at 253-55 (describing most influential federal animal
protections statutes). The Endangered Species Act was "designed to protect against the
extinction of threatened or endangered species, [is] enforced publicly rather than privately,
and [has raised] a number of knotty legal problems." Id. The Marine Mammal Protection
Act "imposes a selective moratorium on the taking and importation of marine mammals
and marine mammal products." Id. The act outlaws commercial whaling and also requires
the Secretary of the Interior to issue regulations to protect marine mammals from unlawful
activity." Id. The Animal Welfare Act "emphasizfes] the need for 'humane care and treat-
ment' in the exhibition of animals, transportation of animals, and 'use' of animals 'as
pets."' Id.
48. See Darcie Magnuson, Service Animals in Training and the Law: An Imperfect
System, 14 SCHOLAR 987, 1005 (2012) (illustrating one example of how federal statutes
have been created to protect animals.) Author contends that "[m]any states have enacted
legislation granting rights and privileges to service animals in training." Id.
49. PAUL WALDAu, ANIMAL RiGirrs: WHAT EVERYONE NEEDs TO KNOW 82 (2011)
(discussing the significance of Germany's efforts to provide constitutional protection to
nonhumans). While this was an important step to securing animal rights, granting constitu-
tional protections is rare; most countries instead rely on passing specific legislation. Id. at
91.
50. See Gary L. Francione, Animals-Property or Person?, in ANIMAL RiGHTs: CUR-
RiENT' DEBATMS AND New DIRECfIONs 108-18 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum
eds., 2004). As Francione explains, "[tihere is really no choice to be made between the
human and the animal interest because the choice has already been predetermined by the
property status of the animal; the 'suffering' of property owners who cannot use their prop-
erty as they wish counts more than animal suffering." Id. at 117. See also GARY L. FRAN-
ClONE, INTRODUCfION To ANIMAl. Rims: YOUR Cim) OR TH- DoG? 55 (2000)
(asserting that rather than balancing the interests of animals against human interests, what
one really balances under animal welfare laws is the "interest of the property owner in
using or treating the animal in a particular way against the interest of the property, which,
in this case, is the animal.").
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implemented." Additionally, the list of those exempt from state anti-
cruelty statutes is considerable; those who use animals for medical and
scientific research, as well as those who are in the business of processing
animals for food, are not prohibited from doing so under the statutes.5 2
To this day, there is no federal statute that regulates the treatment of
animals that are raised for food or food production on farms." With
state exemptions and a lack of federal regulation, farm animals are left
with practically zero protection under current animal law.54 Federal stat-
utes also suffer from the same limitations as state anti-cruelty statutes; the
Animal Welfare Act, for instance, is extremely limited in the type of ani-
mals it protects and lacks sufficient enforcement.5 5
Additionally, animal rights advocates believe that animal welfare laws
are insufficient because they do nothing more than balance the interests
of humans and animals in deciding when a particular act is permitted." If
the human interest in subjecting the animal to harm is greater than the
animal's interest in not suffering, then the act is considered permissible
under animal welfare laws.5 Because of these purported shortcomings,
51. See Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, supra note 46 (outlining how the states' monop-
oly over implementation of anti-cruelty statutes limits the effectiveness of federal regula-
tions); see also Wisch, supra note 40 (describing the reluctance of prosecutors to charge
violators of anti-cruelty laws with a felony). Prosecutors' hesitancy to file felony charges
for animal cruelty may be a result of insufficient resources, lack of thorough investigations,
and a community's sentiment that time is better spent on other crimes. Id.
52. See Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, supra note 46 (discussing list of those exempt of
state anti-cruelty statutes); see also Pacelle, supra note I (discussing the inability of existing
law to address institutional forms of animal exploitation).
53. See Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, supra note 46, at 255 (describing failure of fed-
eral government to regulate food production and farm animals). The federal Animal Wel-
fare Act fails to protect animals raised for clothing or food. Id.
54. Paige M. Tomaselli, Overview of International Comparative Animal Cruelty Laws,
ANIMAL LEGAL AND HiSTORICAL CENTER, available at http://www.animallaw.infolarticles/
ovusicacl.htm.
This means that in states where common husbandry practices are exempted, animals
raised for food are basically without protection. These animals may be systematically
abused without redress. Even in states where farm animals are not exempted from the
anti-cruelty statutes, it is often difficult to get a case into court.
Id.
55. See Sunstein, Can Animals Sue?, supra note 46, at 255 (describing perceived
problems with the Animal Welfare Act). In addition to the lack of protection for farm
animals, the Animal Welfare Act does not have a "requirement for the exercise of horses,"
nor does it offer protections where the "relevant physical environment must promote the
psychological well-being" for dogs, cats, and horses. Id.
56. See, FRANCIONE, INTRODUCC-ION ro ANIMAL Rioirrs: YOUR CEILD OR TIE
Doo?, xxiii (2000) (discussing why anti-cruelty statutes fail to really protect animals).
57. See id. (describing balancing approach under current animal laws). "The usual
response is to claim that some empirical difference between humans and animals justifies
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many animal rights advocates believe that animals need their own rights
if they are to be adequately protected.
A. The Debate Over Animal Welfare and Animal Rights
1. Philosophy and Animal Rights
a. The Early Philosophers of Animal Rights
While an in-depth analysis of the philosophical arguments regarding
animal rights could fill several volumes of text, for the purposes of this
Note, a succinct overview of the general framework is adequate. Animal
rights advocates and animal welfare advocates have been debating the
role animals have in our society for centuries.5  Even today, no uniform
philosophical approach has been adopted.5 9 While there are varying phil-
osophical approaches among today's modern thinkers, all have been in-
fluenced, in some way, by the work and debates of those before them.60
On one side of the debate were thinkers like Rene Descartes and Im-
manuel Kant.6 ' Descartes, an influential seventeenth-century philosophi-
cal thinker, argued that animals were machines that lacked
"understanding and thought."62 Under this Cartesian theory, Descartes
believed that all animals were mechanical, void of any conscious thought
or awareness, and lacked the ability to engage in complex behavior and
speech.
this dissimilar treatment. For example, we maintain that animals cannot think rationally or
abstractly, so it is acceptable for us to treat them as our property." Id.
58. See WALDAU, supra note 49, at 64 (explaining that philosophical arguments have
been advanced for "millennia").
59. See Pamela D. Frasch, Finding Our Voice: Challenges and Opportunities for the
Animal Law Community, 14 ANIMAL L. 1, 3 (2007-2008) (describing the lack of uniformed
voice in animal movement). However, "[slpeaking with a unified voice might also mean
that [advocates] agree to work toward reducing the suffering of animals by using multiple
creative, and perhaps conflicting, legal theories and methodologies to bridge the legal gap
between humans and nonhuman animals." Id.
60. See WALDAU, supra note 49, at 64 (explaining the influence that early arguments
had on today's discussion of animal rights).
61. Scott Wilson, Animals and Ethics: Cartesian Theories, INTERNE'T ENCYCLOPEDIA
o Puin. (Oct. 23, 2001), http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/.
62. See Rene Descartes, Letter of November 23, 1646 to Marquess of Newcastle, in
ANIMAL LAw: WELFARE, INTERESTS, AND RIGHrS 15 (2008) (discussing the inability of
animals to communicate and think).
63. Wilson, supra note 61; see also Descartes, supra note 62, at 15-16 (2008) (stating
that animals conduct their movements without thought process). For example, Descartes
asserted that external actions such as eating or walking were mechanical movements that
involve no thought process. Id. Therefore, in order to show that "our body is not just a
self-moving machine but contains a soul with thoughts" one must be able to communicate
either by words or other signs, something that animals are incapable of doing. Id. But cf
Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, Tom REGAN'S ANIMAL Riirrs & WRITS, http:/
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Adopting a slightly more progressive approach, Immanuel Kant, an
eighteenth-century philosopher, viewed animals as "man's instruments,"
worthy of protection only as far as humans would benefit.M Kant as-
serted that animals were not autonomous beings because they lacked will,
the ability to step away from a desired course of action and determine
which path was correct.
Positioned on the other side of the animal rights debate were philoso-
phers like Voltaire and Jeremy Bentham. Contrary to Descartes' view,
Voltaire, a respected eighteenth-century writer, rejected the notion that
animals were incapable of thought or feeling.67 Just because an animal
may not be able to speak, Voltaire argued, did not render them incapable
of expressing emotion.6 1 Continuing this line of reasoning, Bentham, a
leader in the utilitarian movement, summarized the rights of animals by
famously stating, "[t]he question is not, [c]an they reason? nor [c]an they
talk? but [c]an they suffer?"69
b. Modern Advancements in Animal Welfare
Several major advocates have substantially influenced the animal wel-
fare versus animal rights debate. Peter Singer and Tom Regan are two of
/www.animalsvoice.com/regan/?p=174 (last visited July 26, 2012) (arguing that although an-
imals are not able to perform many of the same functions as human beings, they should not
be considered to have any less value).
64. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, supra note 7, at 3 (reasoning
that people who harm animals will likely behave the same way toward humans). See gener-
ally Scott Wilson, Animals and Ethic: Kantian Theories, INTErINEt1 ENCYCLOEDIA OF
Piin. (Oct. 23, 2001), http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/ (describing characteristics of Kant-
ian theory). A theory is considered Kantian "if it provides an account of the properties
that human beings have and animals lack that warrants our according human beings a very
strong moral status while denying animals any kind of moral status at all." Id.
65. See Scott Wilson, Animals and Ethic: Kantian Theories, INTERNETr ENCYCLOPEDIA
or ii. (Oct. 23, 2001), http://www.iep.utm.edu/anim-eth/ (claiming that only human be-
ings are able to step back from different situations and chose which course of action they
desire).
66. Voltaire: Biography, Bio. TRUE STroizv, http://www.biography.com/people/
voltaire-9520178 (last visited July 29, 2012).
67. Voltaire, A Response to Descartes, in ANIMNAL LAw: WELFARu , INEre ustrs, AND)
RiGis 16-17 (2008) (responding to Descartes position that animals are incapable of
thought).
68. See id. at 17 (describing how animals engage in thought and feel emotions).
69. Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, supra note 7, at 3-4. Bentham
argued that the capacity to suffer, rather than the level of rationality or communicative
skill, is what should serve as the guide-post in granting rights to animals. Id. See generally
Julia Driver, The History of Utilitarianism, STANDARo ENCYCLOPEDIA 01 PmILosom'i-tY
(Mar. 27, 2009) http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/utilitarianism-history (explaining that utili-
tarianism is the belief that whatever action produced the most good is the morally right
action).
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the best-known modern philosophers in support of granting rights to ani-
mals.70 Singer's work, while considered controversial among some
groups, has been incredibly influential; his most famous book, Animal
Liberation, has been described as "the Bible of the animal rights move-
ment."" Influenced by utilitarianism thinking, Singer urges humans to
adopt the principle of "equal consideration of interests" when determin-
ing whether a particular action that harms animals is justified.7 2 Under
this approach, whether one is a human or nonhuman animal is completely
irrelevant; the species distinction is eliminated, and therefore any idea of
human superiority over animals is erased." Once humans and animals
are placed on a morally equal playing field, the only analysis left is to
consider whether the animal, human or nonhuman, is capable of feeling
70. See WALDAU, supra note 49, at 177 (discussing key philosophers of animal rights
movement). Tom Regan is regarded as the best known "rights-based" philosophers while
Peter Singer is known most notably for his utilitarian ideology. Id.
71. See id. (discussing the influence Singer had on animal rights movement). Relig-
ious conservatives, outraged by Singer's criticism of Christianity dealing with animal issues,
as well as his support for human euthanasia, have referred to him as "the most dangerous
man in the world." Id.
72. See Peter Singer, Animal Rights: Debate Between Peter Singer & Richard Posner,
SLATE MAGAZlNE (June 11, 2001), http://www.utilitarian.net/singer/interviews-debates/
200106-.htm (discussing equal consideration of interest premise). Singer argues that un-
like animal welfare theories, which view all humans as superior to animals, the interest of
humans and nonhuman animals should be viewed equally. Id. Singer also argues that dif-
ferentiating on the basis of what species one is, is akin to racism or sexism because it
"use[s] an arbitrary and morally irrelevant fact-membership of a race, sex, or species-as
if it were morally crucial." Id.
73. See Peter Singer, Ethics Beyond Species and Beyond Instinct: A Response to Rich-
ard Posner, in ANIMAL RicI-rs: CURRENT DIBArEs AN) Ne.w DIREcIONs 79-80 (2004)
(explaining the equal consideration principle). Singer argues that human superiority over
animals is not the correct gauge to use when trying to determine whether an action against
an animal is justifiable. Id. This is because the characteristics that supposedly make
humans superior, such as being rational, self-aware, and morally conscious, are not present
in all humans, such as infants or the mentally challenged. Id. See generally Singer, Animal
Rights, supra note 72 (comparing speciesism to racism and sexism). See also Speciesism,
MuRRIAM-WEnsErvii, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/speciesism (last visited
July 29, 2012) (defining speciesism as "prejudice or discrimination based on species; espe-
cially: discrimination against animals."). See generally David R. Schmahmann & Lori J.
Polacheck, The Case Against Animal Rights, 22 B.C. ENvrL. AFF. L. Rv. 747, 751 (1995)
(quoting Singer's primary thesis in Animal Liberation). "I have and know of nothing
which enables me to say, a priori, that a human life of any quality, however low, is more
valuable than animal life of any quality, however high." Id.
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pain.74 According to Singer, when an animal feels pain, its pain matters
just as much as if a human were to feel the same pain 5
Tom Regan, on the other hand, adopts a rights-based approach, argu-
ing in favor of adopting moral rights for animals.7 6 Under this rights
view, Regan asserts that humans and nonhuman animals "all have inher-
ent value, all possess it equally, and all have an equal right to be treated
with respect, to be treated in ways that do not reduce them to the status
of things, as if they existed as resources for others."" Regan applies this
analysis to animals by asserting that animals are like humans in that they
are the experiencing "subjects of a life," and that it is a fundamental mis-
take to view them as a resource.7 s According to Reagan, once humans
stop viewing animals as their personal resource, total dissolution of
animal agriculture, research, and hunting and trapping will become
obligatory."
74. See Singer, Ethics Beyond Species and Beyond Instinct: A Response to Richard
Posner, in ANIMAL Riawrs: CURRENT DEBATES AND NEw DiRCn1ONS, supra note 73, at
80 (discussing the difference between objects that can feel pain and those that cannot).
Once the species distinction is eliminated, Singer explains that a thing will be of moral
concern as long as it is capable of feeling pain or pleasure; as such, a pig is of moral con-
cern while a head of lettuce is not. Id. He admits that under his approach, there may be
some cases where humans will be given preferential treatment over animals; however, this
a result of the varying interests that humans and animals have and is not the result of
speciesism. Id.
75. See id. (arguing that equal weight that should be given to animal suffering and
human suffering).
76. WALDAU, supra note 49, at 177.
77. See Tom Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, Tom REGAN'S ANIMAL RiG-Trrs &
WRITES, http://www.animalsvoice.com/regan/?p=174 (last visited Aug. 10, 2012) (explain-
ing that all who have inherent value have it equally); see also Tom Regan, The Animal
Rights Position, Tom REAaAN's ANIMAL RiGiS & WRrIEs, http://www.animalsvoice.
com/regan/?p=217 (last visited Aug. 4, 2012) (describing similarity between individual
value of humans and that of animals).
78. Regan, The Case for Animal Rights, supra note 77.
We [humans] want and prefer things, believe and feel things, recall and expect things.
And all these dimensions of our life, including our pleasure and pain, our enjoyment
and suffering, our satisfaction and frustration, our continued existence or our untimely
death-all make a difference to the quality of our life as lived, as experienced, by us as
individuals. As the same is true of those animals that concern us .. . they too must be
viewed as the experiencing subjects of a life, with inherent value of their own.
Id.
79. See id. (discussing why total abolition of the use of animals by humans is neces-
sary). Regan believes that animal welfare advocates, who support using animals for human
benefit as long as the pain and suffering of the animal is not too great, are misguided in
their attempt to protect animals because they fail to recognize that animals are not re-
sources. Id. See also Tom REaAN, Tit- CASE FOR ANIMAL Rioirrs 394-98 (2004) (ex-
plaining that under the rights view, vegetarianism is mandatory, hunting and trapping is
forbidden, and all types of animal research is prohibited); see also FRANCIONE, INTRODUC-
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Richard Posner is one of the most prominent scholars to oppose the
animal rights approach adopted by Singer, Regan and other rights activ-
ists.80 Known most famously in the animal law community for the Pos-
ner-Singer debates, Judge Posner directly opposes Singer's theory of
equal consideration of interests." By adopting a human-centric ap-
proach, Posner rejects philosophical arguments as the basis for granting
animals rights; he instead focuses on pragmatic reasons for increasing
animal welfare, such as the cost and benefits to humans if such protec-
tions were granted.82 While Posner concedes that human beings are not
superior or more valuable than nonhuman animals, and to inflict cruelty
on animals is wrong, he rejects Singer's assertion that an animal's pain
should be given equal consideration when determining whose interest will
prevail. Unlike Singer, who ascribes this preferential treatment of
humans to speciesism-the idea that humans prejudicially favor all mem-
bers of their own species over nonhuman animals-Posner explains that
our desire to protect a baby over a dog is actually the result of our moral
intuition." While our moral intuition will lead us to favor humans over
TION ro ANIMAi RIGiHTS, supra note 50, at 153 (discussing implications of viewing animals
as resource). Francione asserts that once we recognize animals are not resources, we can
abolish all institutions that exploit animals on the basis of this falsehood. Id.
80. See Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, supra note 7, at 13 (discuss-
ing Posner's opposition to animal rights).
81. See Peter Singer, Animal Rights, SLATE MAGAZINE (June 12, 2001), http://www.
slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/dialogues/features/2001/animal_rights/2.html (pro-
viding transcript of debate between Posner and Singer of ethical obligation humans have to
animals). Peter Singer and Richard Posner, an appellate judge for the seventh circuit, en-
tered into an exchange concerning whether humans have any ethical obligations to ani-
mals. Id.
82. See Richard Posner, Animal Rights: Legal, Philosophical, and Pragmatic Perspec-
tives, in ANIMAL, RIGHiTLs: CURRENr DuEAlus ANo New DIREIoNs 66 (Cass R. Sunstein
& Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (discussing the human centric approach adopted by
Posner). Posner dismissed the usefulness of philosophical arguments and instead empha-
sized the use of facts as a way to increase the number of humans who empathize with
animal suffering. Id.
It follows that to expand and invigorate the laws that protect animals will require not
philosophical arguments for reducing human beings to the level of the other animals
but facts that will stimulate a greater empathic response to animal suffering and allevi-
ate concern about the human costs of further measures to reduce animal suffering.
Id.
83. See id. (arguing humans have a moral intuition to protect fellow human beings
over nonhuman animals). In explaining the concept of moral intuition, Posner argues that
if a dog were about to attack a baby, a human would favor protecting the child even if
meant causing more pain to the dog to stop it than the dog would have inflicted on the
infant; to choose otherwise, Posner argues, would be "monstrous." Id. at 64. In addressing
Singer's criticism that our moral intuition has previously justified unequal rights for Afri-
can-Americans and women, Posner explains that equality in these areas was not achieved
through the adoption of philosophical arguments but instead through facts that changed
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nonhuman animals, Posner asserts that the moral intuition of most Amer-
icans is to "alleviate animal suffering if it can be done at a modest cost." 84
Because most people generally accept the concept of animal welfare, in
contrast to the more radical approaches adopted by animal right advo-
cates, Posner asserts that enforcing the existing anti-cruelty laws is the
most effective and realistic way to benefit animals.8 5
2. The Property Status of Animals
Within the animal rights debate, a subset issue is whether the property
status of animals should be eliminated in order for animals to receive
adequate legal protection.8 6 The two most prominent scholars in this de-
bate are Gary Francione and Richard Epstein.8 7 A staunch supporter of
removing the classification of property, Francione argues that animal
rights cannot fully be recognized until their status as property is com-
pletely abolished." This is so, Francione asserts, because under existing
animal welfare laws-which require us to balance human and animal in-
terests-an animal's status as property inhibits its interests from ever be-
ing weighed in favor of human interests." Francione believes that if
unnecessary suffering of animals is to be eliminated, then animal welfare
laws that try to balance interests must be abandoned, and humans must
stop using animals in ways in which they would not use their fellow
human beings, no matter how "humane" it may be."o Under Francione's
public opinion; yet such a showing has not been made for equality between humans and
animals. Id. at 65-66.
84. Singer, Animal Rights, supra note 72. Posner explains that a "soft utilitarian ap-
proach"-recognizing that animal suffering is bad and we should do what is reasonable to
alleviate that pain-is a moral intuition of most people in the United States. Id. See also
Francione, Animals-Property or Person?, supra note 49, at 113 (explaining that Western
culture has adopted "humane treatment principle"-the view that humans are morally ob-
ligated to not cause unnecessary suffering to animals).
85. See Posner, supra note 82, at 74 (explaining why the animal rights approach is not
the most efficient way to protect animals).
86. See Moore, supra note 3, at 317 (noting that property status of animals is a serious
issue in animal rights movement); see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Rights of Animals, 70 U.
Ci. L. Riv. 387, 398 (2003) (noting the debate over property status of animals is "one of
the most vigorous debates of all").
87. See Sunstein, Introduction: What Are Animal Rights?, supra note 7, at 13 (discuss-
ing the debate between Francione and Epstein over property status of animals).
88. Francione, Animals-Property or Person?, supra note 50, at 108.
89. Id.
90. FRANCIONE, INTRODUCITON To ANIMAL RiIHs, supra note 56, at 55-56 (discuss-
ing how animal welfare laws and anti-cruelty laws do not provide protection to animals).
Francione argues anti-cruelty statutes fail to provide animals with any meaningful protec-
tion for the following reasons: they exempt most forms of institutionalized exploitation, fail
to provide coverage to all animals, require a defendant to have acted with a particular
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abolitionist approach, once the property status of animals is abolished,
animals would become moral persons with morally significant interests.9'
While an animal's personhood does not require that it be given all the
rights a human being enjoys, it does mean that humans have a "moral
obligation to stop using animals for food, biomedical experiments, en-
tertainment,. or clothing, or any other uses that assume that animals are
merely resources . . . . "92
In stark opposition to Francione, Epstein argues that both human and
animals benefit from an animal's status as property.93 Rejecting the no-
tion that the property status of animals inevitably causes animal suffering,
Epstein believes that their property status actually protects animals by
shielding them from the dangers and difficult lifestyle of wild animals. 9 4
Believing that an animal's sensation and cognitive abilities are inadequate
reasons to provide legal rights, Epstein asserts the best way to protect
animals is to maintain their status as property and continue to enforce
animal welfare and anti-cruelty laws.95
mental state, presume owners of animals will not inflict unnecessary suffering on their
property, and suffer from lack of enforcement. Id.
91. See Francione, Animals-Property or Person?, supra note 50, at 131 (discussing
the personhood of animals); see also Neha Jadeja, Why the Status of Animals Should Re-
main as Property, in PE'OPLE, PROPERTY, oiR PuETs? 17-18 (2006) (explaining that
mandatory vegetarianism and the prohibition of biomedical research on animals will result
if animals are no longer viewed as a resource).
92. Francione, Animals-Property or Person?, supra note 49, at 132.
93. See Moore, supra note 3, at 318 (discussing Epstein's support for property status
of animals); see also Catie Lowder, The Case for Animals as the Property of Humans in
PEor'us, PRovr'iry, OR Pitis? 25 (2006) (asserting that animals' status as property can be
"potentially mutually beneficial").
94. See Richard Epstein, Animals as Objects, or Subjects, of Rights, in ANIMAL
Ric-rrs: CURRENr DEB13ATES AN) Nr'w DImECHONs 148 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C.
Nussbaum eds., 2004) (explaining why animals benefit from property status). Epstein ex-
plains that while the elimination of the property status of animals would prevent humans
from controlling animals, it would also mean that all animals, even our pets, would be left
to fend for themselves in the wild, subjected to attacks by other animals, lack of veterinary
care, and direct access to food and shelter. Id.
95. Id. at 155 (rejecting the idea that animals should be entitled to legal rights). Ep-
stein draws a distinct line between humans and animals, arguing that humans have "differ-
ent moral obligations to members of our own species than we do to chimps or members of
any other species." Id. at 156. Unconcerned with being labeled a "speciesist" because of
his belief that animals and humans are separate, Epstein argues that even animal right
advocates, who desire to grant animal rights based on their level of cognitive ability, are
themselves "speciesists" by engaging in arbitrary line drawing. Id. at 155.
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3. Drawing the Line
If we are to accept that animals should be given rights, the next logical
question becomes: "Where '[ ] do we draw the line?"' 6 In determining
which animals are entitled to rights and which are not, animal rights ad-
vocates have yet to adopt a uniform position.9 7 Renowned animal rights
attorney, Steven Wise urges us to adopt animal rights one step at a time,
beginning with the most basic liberties such as immunity from slavery or
torture.98 For an animal to be entitled to personhood and liberty rights,
Wise asserts that it must have "practical autonomy," which is achieved
when an animal "can desire; can intentionally try to fulfill her desire; and
possesses a sense of self sufficiency to allow her to understand, even
dimly, that she is a being who wants something and is trying to get it.""
Although Wise admits that practical autonomy is hard to quantify, he be-
lieves that there is a correlation between the mental complexities of ani-
mals and its level of practical autonomy.' 00 Once it is determined how
much practical autonomy an animal possesses, liberty rights and per-
sonhood are then granted in proportion to the animal's degree of its au-
tonomy.' 1 Thus, under Wise's approach, an animal with greater
cognitive ability will have more practical autonomy and in turn be enti-
96. James Rachels, Drawing Lines, in ANIMAL RIGHTs: CURRENT Di-HATES AND) New
DIREIClONs 162 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004) (discussing why
people are skeptical of granting rights to animals).
97. Frasch, supra note 59 (describing a lack of uniformed voice in animal movement).
98. Steven M. Wise, Animal Rights, One Step at a Time, in ANIMAL RIGirrs: CURRFNT
DEBATES AND Ni.w DIRECIfIONs 27 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004).
Wise explains that animals are entitled to certain legal immunities that prevent one person
from interfering with another. Id. Immunities apply to animals of all intellect because it is
not a type of right that needs to be asserted. Id.
99. Id. at 32. The elements of practical autonomy are "self, intentions, desires, senti-
ence, and . . . consciousness." Id. at 39. Wise notes that all animals, regardless of whether
they have practical autonomy, may be entitled to equality rights. Id. at 33. "Cognition and
rights deservedness are not interwoven as tightly as Wise believes . . . ." Id. But see Pos-
ner, supra note 82, at 56 (arguing that cognitive capacity is not a necessary or sufficient
condition of having rights). Posner criticizes Wise's approach of granting rights based on
the level of cognitive ability, arguing that "most of us would think it downright offensive to
give greater rights to monkeys . . . than to retarded people upon a showing that the mon-
key ... has a larger cognitive capacity than a profoundly retarded human being." Id. at 56.
100. Wise, supra note 98, at 33. Wise explains the approach used by Professor Donald
Griffin, which assigns animals to one of four categories depending on the level of their
cognitive ability. Id. Animals in category one have the greatest cognitive ability while
category four contains animals with the lowest mental complexities. Id. at 35. For cases in
which scientists cannot precisely measure an animal's cognitive ability, Wise asserts that we
should adopt a "precautionary principle" that errs on the side of granting practical auton-
omy to these animals. Id. at 36.
101. Id. at 39. Wise asserts that the more practical autonomy an animal has, the
greater amount of liberty rights to which it is entitled. Id. at 33. He supports this approach
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tied to more liberty rights and personhood than an animal with fewer
mental complexities." 2
Unlike Wise, who prefers to use a scale of practical autonomy to deter-
mine which animals are afforded rights, other scholars caution against
making determinations based on such a form of measure."o3 After exam-
ining various aspects of animals' behaviors, such as self-awareness, mem-
ory, and ability to plan for the future, Rogers and Kaplan believe that
research into the higher cognition of animals is only in the beginning
stages.' 0 4
III. ANIMAL WELFARE: BEYOND THE SCOPE OF
THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENT
A. An Introduction to the Thirteenth Amendment
In 1863, during the middle of a bloody Civil War and with secession
plaguing the country, President Abraham Lincoln issued the Emancipa-
tion Proclamation, which declared "that all persons held as slaves" within
the Southern states "are, and henceforward shall be free."' Fearing
that the document lacked permanence and could be subject to change
after the war ended, abolitionists believed that a constitutional amend-
by comparing the varying levels of cognitive abilities in animals to the mental capabilities
of mentally challenged humans. Id.
102. Id. at 35 (explaining the correlation between cognitive ability, practical auton-
omy, and liberty rights; also, explaining that animals with greater cognitive ability receive
greater liberty rights). Wise explains that animals within category one and sometimes cate-
gory two, such as great apes, Atlantic bottle-nosed dolphins, African elephants and African
grey parrots, are entitled to basic liberty rights, while animals in category three and four
most likely are not. Id. at 41.
103. Moore, supra note 3, at 319. Lesley Rogers and Gisela Kaplan believe that an
animal's biology and behavior can help guide animal rights policy, but warn against using a
scale approach in deciding which animals should be awarded rights. Id.
104. See Lesley J. Rogers & Gisela Kaplan, All Animals Are Not Equal: The Interface
Between Scientific Knowledge and Legislation for Animals, in ANIMAL RirTs: CURRENT
DEBATES AND NEw DIRECrIONs 193 (Cass R. Sunstein & Martha C. Nussbaum eds., 2004)
(explaining why caution should be used when relying on scientific research to develop
animal legislation).
105. The Emancipation Proclamation, NATIONAL ARCHIVEs & REcoRis ADMINIS-
TRATION (July 20, 2012), http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured documents/emancipa-
tion-proclamation/. Although the Emancipation Proclamation applied only to Southern
states that had already seceded and did not actually end slavery, it was influential because
of the message that it sent to the country and for the moral force it added to the Union's
cause. Id. Though the Emancipation Proclamation did not, by itself "free a single slave," it
still remains "the most powerful instrument of slavery's destruction." MICHAEL VOREN-
waoi, FINAl FREiDoM: THE; CivIL WAR, THE ABoLrnIoN oF SLAVERY, AND THE Tulz-
TrIENT11 AMI;NDMENT 1 (2001).
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ment guaranteeing emancipation was necessary. 106 Nearly a year after
Lincoln issued the proclamation, Congressman James Ashley and Senator
John Henderson introduced a bill supporting a constitutional amendment
to end slavery throughout the entire country. 07 The language that was
used in drafting the amendment was taken in large part from the North-
west Ordinance of 1787.ios Introducing the amendment however,
ushered in a series of obstacles that delayed its approval. Lengthy con-
106. See John Hope Franklin, The Emancipation Proclamation: An Act oflJustice, NA-
TIONAL GEOGRAPHIC Ne-ws (Feb. 6, 2003), http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/pf/
43226389.htmi (discussing need for constitutional amendment because of limited effective-
ness of Emancipation Proclamation); see generally Gordon Leidner, The Thirteenth
Amendment, GREAT AMERICAN HisTORY, http://www.greatamericanhistory.net/amend-
ment.htm (last updated July 4, 2012) (illuminating Republicans' strong anti-slavery senti-
ment as "[a]bolishing slavery was almost exclusively a Republican party effort . . . ."); see
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 68 (1872) (discussing Congress' desire to constitution-
ally guarantee promises made in Lincoln's proclamation in order to avoid any challenges to
its legality):
The proclamation of President Lincoln expressed an accomplished fact . . . when he
declared slavery abolished . . . . But the war being over, those who had succeeded in
re-establishing the authority of the Federal government were not content to permit
this great act of emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest or the procla-
mation of the Executive, both of which might have been questioned in after times, and
they determined to place this main and most valuable result in the Constitution of the
restored Union as one of its most fundamental articles. Hence the thirteenth article of
[thel amendment of that instrument.
Id.
107. See ALXANDER TsEsis, TEi- TiiIRTEENTii AMENDMENT ANi AMERICAN FRE-
Dom: A LEGAL HISTORY 3 (2004) (discussing beginning steps in drafting Thirteenth
Amendment). Although the abolishment movement was primarily headed by Republi-
cans, Senator John Henderson, a Missouri Democrat, joined the cause by introducing a
joint resolution to end slavery. Melissa Ann Collison, 13th Amendment History, BRIGir
Hun, http://www.brighthub.com/education/homework-tips/artices/87064.aspx (last up-
dated Sept. 15, 2010). Henderson's leadership resulted in an increase in Democrats sup-
port for what was largely a Republican led effort. 13th Amendment, CiVIL WAR, http://
www.mrlincolnandfreedom.org/inside.asplD=56&subjectlD=3 (last visited Aug. 10,
2012).
108. See Tsisis, supra note 107. Tsesis notes that the use of "readily identifiable
model language" to draft the first section of the amendment was necessary to attract sup-
port from both Radical Republicans and War Democrats. Id. See generally Transcript of
Northwest Ordinance, OURDocuMEN rs.cov, available at http://www.ourdocuments.gov/
doc.phpdoc=8&page=transcript (outlining provisions of the Northwest Ordinance). Arti-
cle 6 of the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 states in part, "[tihere shall be neither slavery
nor involuntary servitude in the said territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes
whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." Id. "[That) the Thirteenth Amend-
ment applies only to persons is found in the qualifying phrase 'except as a punishment for
crime.' The Supreme Court noted that the 'punishment for crime' language 'gives an idea
of the class of servitude 'or slavery that is meant by the Amendment." Tilikum ex rel.
People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Sea World Parks & Entm't, No. 11cv2476
2012 U.S. Lexis 15258, at *11 (S.D. Cal. 2012).
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gressional debates, a failed attempt at ratification, and a presidential cam-
paign devoted to securing the passage of the proposed amendment, all
contributed to a rather arduous and prolonged journey of anti-slavery
legislation finally materializing.1 09 Despite the rocky road to ratification,
the Thirteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution was even-
tually ratified in 1865."10 Officially prohibiting slavery in the United
States, the Thirteenth Amendment stated, "[nleither slavery nor involun-
tary servitude, except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any
place subject to their jurisdiction.""' In order to determine whether the
Thirteenth Amendment's protection extends to animals, a closer exami-
nation of the historical context in which the Thirteenth Amendment was
ratified, as well as previous judicial interpretations of the amendment, is
necessary.112
B. Historical Analysis
1. Historical Setting of the Thirteenth Amendment
In order to form a proper interpretation of Thirteenth Amendment, it
is important to look at the historical setting in which it was created." 3 By
the mid-1700s, the enslavement of African-Americans had become in-
grained in the communities of both the Southern and Northern colo-
109. See TSESIS, supra note 107 (discussing influence of 1864 presidential campaign in
ratification of Thirteenth Amendment). Although the Senate passed the proposed amend-
ment in 1864, newly elected congressional Democrats were effective in blocking the neces-
sary votes needed for it to pass in the House. Id. It wasn't until President Lincoln, coming
off an election win, used his influence to sway congressional opinion in favor of the amend-
ment. Id. See also MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: TiH CIVIL WAR, THE ABOLI-
TION OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTH AMENDMENTr 2 (2001) (describing the road from
Emancipation Proclamation to Thirteenth Amendment as "anything but predictable").
110. 13th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, LIBRARY OF CONGREss (May 12,
2011), http://www.loc.govfrr/program/bib/ourdocs/13thamendment.html#External. Passed
by Congress on January 31, 1865, the Thirteenth Amendment was not officially ratified by
the states until December of that year. Id.
111. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIII, § 1.
112. See generally Ragini Tripathi, The H-2B Visa: Is This How We Treat a Guest?, 11
SCHOLAR 519 (2009) (discussing the judicial interpretations of the Thirteenth Amendment
as applied to immigrant workers); Zoe Elizabeth Lees, Payday Peonage: Thirteenth
Amendment Implications in Payday Lending, 15 SCHOLAR 63 (analyzing judicial interpre-
tations of the Thirteenth Amendment applicable to those forced into labor).
113. United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 317 (1941). "In the construction of the
constitution, we must look to the history of the times, and examine the state of things
existing when it was framed and adopted . . Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S.
657, 658 (1838).
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nies." 4 Despite what seemed like promising language in the Declaration
of Independence of 1776, slaves would not see equal freedom realized
until nearly ninety years later.' 15 When the Framers convened at the
1787 Constitutional Convention, proslavery Southerners threatened not
to ratify the Constitution unless slavery was guaranteed constitutional
protection. The Southerners were successful, and slavery remained an
unshakeable institution in the United States until the mid-1800s, when
tensions over federalism, "westward expansion[,] and slavery exploded
into the American Civil War."" 6 The next four years saw the secession
of Southern states from the Union, unimaginable bloodshed, and a coun-
try deeply divided over the issue of slavery." 7 It is within this context
that the Thirteenth Amendment was drafted, debated, and ratified."'
With the United States having just fought a civil war centered largely on
the issue of human slavery, the argument that the purpose behind passing
the Thirteenth Amendment was anything but providing equal freedom
for all human beings would be insincere.'" While tensions over human
114. Tsrisi's, supra note 107, at 12; see Freedom and Bondage in the Colonial Era,
AFRICANS IN AMERICA, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part2/2narrl.html (outlining eco-
nomic incentives and benefits of slavery). Attracted by large profits and growing indus-
tries, many colonists used a business rationale to justify slavery. Id.
115. TSisis, supra note 107, at 12. While the Declaration of Independence and its
promise of universal freedom did not end slavery, Radical Republicans come back to this
language years later as they begin their quest for a constitutional amendment ending slav-
ery. Id. "We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they
are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life,
Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness." The Declaration of Independence: A Transcript,
Tin CHARTERS OF FiEEDoM: "A NEw WORLD AT HAND," http://www.archives.gov/exhib-
its/charters/declarationtranscript.htmI (last visited Aug. 10, 2012).
116. See American Civil War, HisroRY.com, http://www.history.com/topics/american-
civil-war (last visited Mar. 10, 2012) (discussing causes of American Civil War). While the
events leading up to the civil war cannot be fully explained here, it is important to note that
Southern states believed the abolition of slavery would destroy their economic way of life.
Id. As Northern opposition to slavery increased, as demonstrated by "Bleeding Kansas,"
John Brown's raid at Harper's Ferry, and the election of President Abraham Lincoln,
southerners believed secession was their only alternative. Id.
117. See id. (describing effects of the Civil War); see also TSESIs, supra note 107, at 23
(describing split in country over issue of slavery during Civil War). "The Civil War pitted
the conservative forces wanting to maintain the status quo against those who desired to use
Lincoln's election as first step to the logical emancipation that Framers like Washington,
Jefferson, and Madison had foreseen." Id.
118. See Tsinsts, supra note 107, at 23-33 (discussing context in which people realized
constitutional amendment prohibiting slavery was necessary).
119. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (discussing what the Thirteenth
Amendment was designed to do); see also MICHAEL VORENDERG, FINAL FiRLEOM: TE-
CivI. WAR, THE Anourro OF SLAvEY, AND 'IIe TiiRri I:NTHI AMENDMENT 3 (2001)
(noting possible ambiguity over "true" meaning of Thirteenth Amendment). While Voren-
berg claims that the original meaning of the Thirteenth Amendment may be hard to ascer-
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slavery were incredibly prevalent in the years leading up to the Thir-
teenth Amendment's passage, legal protection for animals on the other
hand, was only in its infancy. 1 2 0 Therefore, it is highly unlikely that ani-
mals, which were just beginning to be viewed by the general public as
something distinguishable from that of a chair, or any other piece of per-
sonal property, were intended to be included under the Thirteenth
Amendment's protection from slavery and involuntary servitude.1 2 1
2. Plain Meaning: A Drafting History
In interpreting the Thirteenth Amendment to determine whether it is
applicable to nonhuman animals, it is necessary to examine the drafting
history of the amendment."' The most logical place to begin is with the
text of the amendment, deciphering what the words meant to the framers
who drafted it.123 In Gibbons v. Ogden,'12 4 the Supreme Court held that
when interpreting the drafters' intent, one can correctly presume that the
drafters "generally employ[ed] the words which most directly and aptly
express the ideas they intend[ed] to convey" and used "words in their
natural sense."12 1 When the Thirteenth Amendment was drafted and rat-
ified, the term "slavery" was then defined as "[t]he condition of a slave;
the state of entire subjection of one person to the will of another."12 6
Additionally, for decades leading up to the ratification of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, public discussion focused on the issue of African-
American slavery.127 After all, the Civil War, which was responsible in
tain, his analysis is focused on what freedoms the amendment provided to what Americans,
not whether the amendment was applicable to nonhumans. Id.
120. See Peter Singer, The Rights of Animals, NEwswiEEK MAGAZINE (Nov. 18, 2008,
7:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2008/11/18/the-rights-of-animals.html
(explaining that the notion of granting rights to animals was first advocated for in the
1970s); see also Human Attitudes and Opinions About Animals, QUEENSLAND GOVIERN-
MENT: AGRICULTURE, FISiHERIES AND FoRESTRv, http://www.dpi.qld.gov.au/4790_10081.
htm (last visited Mar. 1 2012) (explaining that animal laws passed in 1800s only dealt with
wanton acts of cruelty to animals).
121. See FAVRL, supra note 33 (discussing the treatment of animals prior to the
amendment's ratification in 1865).
122. See United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985) (using drafting
history to interpret constitutional provision).
123. See id. at 1009-10 (using text of constitutional provision as starting point of its
analysis).
124. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 188-89 (1824).
125. Id. at 188.
126. NOAH WEBSTER, A DIcIONARY OF THE ENais LANGUAGE 1241 (1864) (de-
fining slave as "person").
127. See Slavery and the Civil War, NATIONAL PARK SERVICE: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
THE INTERIOR, 2 (June, 2005), available at http://www.nps.gov/liho/planyourvisit/upload/
cwslavery.site bulletin.pdf (discussing turmoil over issue of African slavery in decades
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large part for the creation of the Thirteenth Amendment, was not fought
over the permissibility of owning a cat, turtle, or any other nonhuman
animal.128 Given the 1864 definition of slave and the public perception of
what a slave was in the mid-1800s, it is logical to conclude that the term
"slave," used in its natural sense, referred to a person, not an animal.' 2 9
a. The Current Constitutional Language
Further support that the drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment under-
stood the word slave to refer to person is evidenced by the then existing
language of the Constitution. 3 0 While the word "slavery" did not appear
in the Constitution until the adoption of the Thirteenth Amendment, the
document clearly referenced slavery in the Three-Fifths Clause, the 1808
preceding Civil War). Events like the Missouri Compromise, the Nat Turner slave rebel-
lion, the Kansas-Nebraska Act, the creation of the anti-slavery Republican Party, the infa-
mous Dred Scot( decision, and the Election of 1860 all centered on the issue of African-
American slavery in the years leading up to the Civil War. Id.
128. See The 13th Amendment is Ratified, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/this-
day-in-history/13th-amendment-ratified (last visited Mar. 18, 2012) (explaining "the single
greatest change wrought by the Civil War" was officially noted in the Constitution with the
words of Thirteenth Amendment); see also Slavery and the Civil War, supra note 127 (not-
ing role slavery played in Civil War). While the role of slavery in causing the Civil War has
been contested, most historians agree that "slavery and the status of African Americans
were at the heart of the crisis that plunged the U.S. into a civil war from 1861-1865." Id.
129. See Motion to Dismiss at 8, Tilikum ex rel. People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals v. Sea World Parks & Entm't, No. 11cv2476 2012 U.S. LexisDist. LEXIS 15258, at
*10 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (discussing how framers of Thirteenth Amendment adopted dictionary
definition of "slavery" when drafting amendment). Congressman James Wilson, a sponsor
of an earlier abolition amendment that was later used to shape the language of the Thir-
teenth Amendment, provided a verbatim reading of the dictionary definition of the term
"slavery" in his address to the House of Representatives. Tilikum ex rel. People for the
Ethical Treatment of Animals v. Sea World Parks & Entm't, No. 11cv2476 2012 U.S. Lexis
15258, at *8 (S.D. Cal. 2012) (demonstrating drafters' understanding that term "slavery"
referred to people); see also MAX FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FiDERAL CONvtIrnON 255
(1911) (describing statements made by representatives at Constitutional Convention of
1787 demonstrate word "person" in Three-Fifths Clause, 1808 Clause, and Fugitive Slave
Clause refer to slaves). Rufus King, a Constitutional Convention representative, stated
that Article 1, Section 2, paragraph 3 of the Three Fifths Clause as follows:
There has. . . been much misconception on this section. It is a principle of this Consti-
tution, that representation and taxation should go hand in hand. This paragraph states
that the number of free persons shall be determined, by adding to the whole number
of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding
Indians not taxed, three-fifths of all other persons. These persons are the slaves."
Id.
130. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 205 (1920) (noting that constitutional
amendments should be interpreted in connection with the original clauses that they seek to
amend).
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Clause, and the Fugitive Slave Clause. In each of these three clauses,
the word "person" is used when referring to both the institution of slav-
ery and slaves themselves.' 3 2 Given that the drafters of the Thirteenth
Amendment sought to repeal these provisions, one can infer that the
meaning of the term "slavery" in the Thirteenth Amendment, in order to
adequately amend the Constitution as it then stood, also referred to
people.
b. The Northwest Ordinance of 1787
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 further supports the notion that the
Thirteenth Amendment was intended to apply to persons, and not ani-
mals. 3 Rather than starting with a blank slate, the drafters of the Thir-
131. See References to Slavery in the Constitution, available at http://www.teachin-
gamericanhistory.us/tah_2/lesson plansj06/walker appeal/documents/slavery constitution.
pdf (listing articles of Constitution that reference slavery); see also Popular Names of Sec-
tion and Clauses, U.S. CONStIION http://www.usconstitution.net/constpop.html (last
modified Jan. 10, 2011) (providing informal names used for referring to specific constitu-
tional clauses); see also Ronald L. F. Davis, Slavery in America: Historical Overview, AFRI-
CAN HOLOCAUST, (discussing three proslavery clauses in Constitution). The Three-Fifths
Clause required that every slave be counted as three-fifths of a free person in determining
a state's representation, the 1808 clause guaranteed the existence of the slave trade with
Africa until 1808, and the Fugitive Slave clause permitted slaveholders to cross state lines
in order to capture runaway slaves. Id.; see also MAX FARRAND, R-CORDS OF TE FroE-
ERAL CONVENTION 255 (1911) (quoting Constitutional Convention Representative Rufus
King's explanation of the Three-Fifths Clause).
132. U.S. CONST., art. 1 § 2 (enumerating the Three-Fifths Clause, which was later
superseded by Fourteenth Amendment). The Three-Fifth Clause states:
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several states ...
according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the
whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years,
and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other persons.
Id. See also U.S. CONST., art. 1 § 9 (stating 1808 Clause). The 1808 Clause states:
The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by Congress prior to the Year one thou-
sand eight hundred and eight, but a tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation,
not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
Id. See also U.S. CONST., art. IV § 2 (stating Fugitive Slave Clause, which was superseded
by Thirteenth Amendment). The Fugitive Slave Clause states:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping
into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged
from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Part to whom
such Service or Labour may be due.
Id.
133. See Motion, supra note 129, at 10 (arguing that model used for Section 1 of Thir-
teenth Amendment supports position that amendment is applicable only to human beings);
see also Northwest Ordinance, Lm3RARY OF CONRESS (July 30, 2010) http://www.loc.gov/
rr/program/bib/ourdocs/northwest.htmi (explaining purpose of Northwest Ordinance) Offi-
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teenth Amendment chose to model Section 1 of the Amendment after
language found in the Northwest Ordinance.13 4 Responsible for outlaw-
ing slavery in the New Northern Territory, Article 6 of the Northwest
Ordinance states in relevant part:
There shall be neither slavery nor involuntary servitude in the said
territory, otherwise than in the punishment of crimes whereof the
party shall have been duly convicted: Provided, always, That any per-
son escaping into the same, from whom labor or service is lawfully
claimed in any one of the original States, such fugitive may be law-
fully reclaimed and conveyed to the person claiming his or her labor
or service as aforesaid.13 5
The reference to "any person . . . from whom labor or service is law-
fully claimed" in Article 6 of the Northwest Ordinance signifies that its
beginning phrase, forbidding slavery and involuntary servitude, is appli-
cable specifically to persons, not animals.136 Modeling nearly all of the
language of Section 1 of the Thirteenth Amendment after the Northwest
Ordinance, it is clear that the drafters hoped to emulate the intentions of
cially named, "An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory of the United States
North West of the River Ohio," the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 "established a govern-
ment for the Northwest Territory, outlined the process for admitting a new state to the
Union, and guaranteed that newly created states would be equal to the original thirteen
states" and outlawed slavery in the new territories (noting that ordinance of 1787 outlawed
slavery in new territories). Id.
134. See Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 240 (1911) (explaining drafters of Thir-
teenth Amendment borrowed language from ordinance) "The language of the 13th
Amendment was not new. It reproduced the historic words of the ordinance of 1787 for
the government of the Northwest Territory and gave them unrestricted application within
the United States and all places subject to their jurisdiction." Id. See also United States v.
Shackney, 333 F.2d 475, 484 (2d Cir. 1964) (explaining intention to follow language of
Northwest Ordinance was clear from Congressional debates over Thirteenth Amendment);
see also MICHAEL VORENuERG, FINAL FRzEEDOM: TiH CIVIL WAR, -ni Anoun1oN OF
SLAVERY, AND e TH-IRTFNTi AMENDMENI 55 (2001) (explaining that Judiciary Com-
mittee favored simple language of Northwest Ordinance when drafting Thirteenth Amend-
ment). The drafters of the Thirteenth Amendment rejected Senator Charles Sumner's
proposal, which used language that declared all people "equal before the law," in favor of
the straightforward abolition of slavery and involuntary servitude found in the Northwest
Ordinance of 1787. Id. See also DANInL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHF-RRY, A HisTORY O
Toii, AMERICAN CONSTITUION 277 (1990) (discussing framers' insistence to stick with fa-
miliar language of Northwest Ordinance when drafting Thirteenth Amendment).
135. See Transcript of Northwest Ordinance, OunDocumimrs.cov, http://www.our
documents.govidoc.php?flash=true&doc=8&page=transcript (citing language of Article 6
of Northwest Ordinance).
136. See Northwest Ordinance, LIBRARY 01 CONGRESS (July 20, 2010) http://www.loc.
govrr/program/bib/ourdocs/northwest.html (explaining that one of several purposes be-
hind passing Northwest Ordinance was to prevent slavery and protect civil liberties in the
new territory).
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the 1787 ordinance by outlawing human slavery and involuntary
servitude.' 37
c. The Emancipation Proclamation
Although the actual language of the Thirteenth Amendment was taken
from the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the inspiration behind the
amendment came in large part from President Lincoln's Emancipation
Proclamation in 1863. 13 From the moment President Lincoln assumed
office, he was pressured by radical Republicans and abolitionists to im-
mediately emancipate the slaves.139 Although hesitant to do so without
having a strong public backing, Lincoln soon realized that emancipation
was a necessary step toward securing a Union victory.140 Coming off a
Union win at the Battle of Antietam, Lincoln issued the Emancipation
Proclamation, declaring all slaves in states that were "'in rebellion against
the United States"' freed.1 4' Pertinent to whether the Emancipation
Proclamation could be interpreted to apply to nonhuman animals, the
document states:
137. See MICHAEL VORENBERG, FINAL FREEDOM: THi Civu,. WAR, T BE A OIrnON
OF SLAVERY, AND THE THIRTEENTHI AMENDMENT 55 (2001) (explaining that the drafters
of Thirteenth Amendment chose language of Northwest Ordinances specifically for its sim-
plistic and straightforward ban on slavery and involuntary servitude).
138. See Emancipation Proclamation, Hisrony.com, http://www.history.com/topics/
emancipation-proclamation (explaining Thirteenth Amendment was passed as a way to
legally guarantee promises of Emancipation Proclamation). Because the Emancipation
Proclamation was a war measure and could face constitutional problems after the Civil
War ended, many Republicans believed that a constitutional amendment prohibiting slav-
ery was. Id.
139. See Abraham Lincoln Papers: Emancipation Proclamation, http://memory.loc.
gov/ammem/alhtmi/almintr.html (last visited July 20, 2012) (discussing the trouble Presi-
dent Lincoln faced in trying to preserve the Union while emancipating slaves).
140. Africans in America, The Civil War and Emancipation, PBS, (July 29, 2012, 2:00
PM) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/aia/part4/4p2967.htmi.
141. See TsEsis, supra note 107, at 36 (describing President Lincoln's desire to wait for
a Union victory before issuing proclamation); see also The Emancipation Proclamation,
supra note 104 (describing limited scope of Emancipation Proclamation). The Emancipa-
tion Proclamation applied only to states that had seceded from the Union, thereby exempt-
ing slaves in the border states and under Union control. Id. See also VORENBE2-RG, supra
note 137, at 1 (explaining that the Emancipation Proclamation "did not free a single
slave"); but see VORENBERG, supra note 136, at 1 (explaining influence of Emancipation
Proclamation despite its inability to free slaves); see also TsE'sIs, supra note 107, at 36-37
(describing significance of proclamation). "The proclamation offered them [slaves] un-
bounded hope of freedom and army protection." Id. at 36. See also Ta-Nehisi Coates,
Obama and His Discontents, N.Y. TIMEs, July 27, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/
28/opinion/28coates.html (quoting Fredrick Douglas description of the Emancipation Proc-
lamation as "the greatest event of our nation's history.").
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All[ ] persons held as slaves within any State or designated part of a
State, the people whereof shall then be in rebellion against the
United States, shall be then, thenceforward, and forever free; and
the Executive Government of the United States, including the mili-
tary and naval authority thereof, will recognize and maintain the
freedom of such persons, and will do no act or acts to repress such
persons, or any of them, in any efforts they may make for their actual
freedom.14 2
By mentioning the term "person" three times within one sentence, the
document clearly specifies that it was intended to protect persons, and
nothing else. 14 3 Given that the Thirteenth Amendment was seen as way
to constitutionalize the promises made in the Emancipation Proclama-
tion, one can logically conclude that the Thirteenth Amendment pro-
tected only persons as well.'144
d. Ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment
Nearly a year after President Lincoln delivered the Emancipation Proc-
lamation, Representative James R. Ashley introduced the first bill sup-
porting a constitutional amendment prohibiting slavery.1 45 It would be
the joint resolution drafted by the Senate Judiciary Committee, however,
that would later become the Thirteenth Amendment. '4  Drafting the
142. See The Emancipation Proclamation, supra note 105 (providing the text of the
Emancipation Proclamation of 1863).
143. See id. (emphasizing use of the word "person" three times in one sentence).
144. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 68 (1872) (describing how the proclama-
tion lead to creation of Thirteenth Amendment).
The proclamation of the President Lincoln expressed an accomplished fact as to a
large portion of the insurrectionary districts, when he declared slavery abolished in
them all. But the war being over, those who had succeeded in re-establishing the
authority of the Federal government were not content to permit this great act of
emancipation to rest on the actual results of the contest of the proclamation of the
Executive, both of which might have been questioned in after times, and they deter-
mined to place this main and most valuable result in the Constitution of the restored
Union as one of its fundamental articles.
Id. See also Tsbsis, supra note 107, at 38 (describing the language of Northwest Ordinance
as the "foundation of Thirteenth Amendment").
145. See TsEsis, supra note 107, at 38 (discussing the introduction of proposed amend-
ments in House of Represenatives). Representative James Wilson also introduced a bill
the same day as Ashley; his proposal was a more specific joint resolution that adopted the
language of the Northwest Ordinance. Id.
146. See id. at 39 (describing final version of Thirteenth Amendment); see also VoiR-
ENBERG, supra note 136, at 55 (discussing drafting process of Senate Judiciary Committee)
"Perhaps the most important decision of the Judiciary Committee was the rejection of
[Senator] Sumner's explicitly egalitarian language in favor of the language of the North-
west Ordinance, which simply prohibited slavery and involuntary servitude." Id.
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document proved to be only the beginning, for what followed was a diffi-
cult road to ratification.' 4 7 Although the congressional debates on the
Thirteenth Amendment are too extensive to be fully addressed here,
there are plenty of examples throughout the debates that demonstrate
both parties' belief that the proposed amendment's prohibition on slavery
referred to people, not animals."' For instance, one of the sponsors of
the amendment, Representative James Wilson, described slavery as a
state of affairs in which "it[ ] was perfectly natural for the comparatively
few men who held four million human beings in bondage." 4 9 Another
sponsor of the amendment, Senator Lyman Trumball, commented that
the ratification of the amendment would "restore to a whole race that
freedom which is their by the gift of God, but which we for generations
we have wickedly denied them."' Lastly, another representative de-
scribed slavery as the "hateful dominion of man over the souls and bodies
of his fellow-men.""' While these are only three comments made during
an extensive debate process, the key point is that there are countless ref-
erences directly referencing slaves as persons, not animals.
C. Judicial Interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment
1. Interpreting the Terminology
Judicial interpretation of the Thirteenth Amendment text provides fur-
ther support that only people-not animals-are guaranteed protection
from slavery and involuntary servitude.15 2 When the words of a constitu-
tional provision are unambiguous, a court's inquiry is stopped short, for
unambiguous language leaves "no door left open for construction, or any
proper ground upon which the intention of the framers of the constitution
could be inquired into . . . .".s5 In the Slaughter-House Cases, the Su-
preme Court unequivocally held that the term "servitude" in the Thir-
147. See TSESIs, supra note 107, at 39 (noting the amendments' initial failure in House
of Representatives). Although the Senate passed the resolution in 1864, it failed to receive
the necessary two-thirds supermajority in the House of Representatives. Id. A round of
extensive debates followed, and the amendment was eventually ratified in 1865. Id.; see
also VORENERG, supra note 137, at 90-94 (discussing Congressional debates on Thir-
teenth Amendment).
148. See, e.g., Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439-44 (1968) (reviewing
statements made during Congressional debates to construe the Thirteenth Amendment).
149. See CONG. GLOBEI, 38th CONG., 1st SE~ss., 1200 (Mar. 19, 1864).
150. See CONG. GLoi, 38th CONG., 1st SFs., 1314 (Mar. 28, 1864).
151. See CONG. GiLoBE, 38th CONG., 1st. Su-ss., 200 (Jan. 10, 1865).
152. See generally Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 69 (1872).
153. See Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. 213, 302-03 (1827) (noting that when language is
unambiguous, judicial interpretation is limited).
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teenth Amendment applies only to persons.15 4 The Court reasoned that
the qualifying term "involuntary"-"which can only apply to human be-
ings"-proves that the Thirteenth Amendment requires a "personal ser-
vitude." 55 Additionally, the Court noted that the amendment's language
exempting servitude as punishment for a crime indicates that a certain
"class of servitude . . . is meant," and thereby rejected the plaintiff's claim
that property could be subjected to servitude.' 56 Because similar "pun-
ishment for a crime" language qualifies the term "slavery" in Section 1 of
the Thirteenth Amendment, one can correctly conclude that slavery ap-
plies only to creatures capable of being convicted of a crime. 5 7
2. The Scope of Thirteenth Amendment
While the drafting history of the Thirteenth Amendment indicates that
the framers intended to combat the institution of African slavery, early
Supreme Court cases interpreting the amendment held that persons of all
races were entitled to the amendment's protection."' In fact, the Thir-
teenth Amendment has been extended beyond African slavery to reach
other "morally unjust conditions of bondage and forced service," most
notably in the peonage cases.' 59 In all of the cases in which the Thir-
teenth Amendment has been extended beyond African slavery, however,
154. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 69 (1872) (holding that "servitude" related
only to human beings). "That a personal servitude was meant is proved by the use of the
word 'involuntary,' which can apply only to human beings." Id.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. U.S. CONs-c. amend. XIII, § 1; see also Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 69 (ex-
plaining that certain "class of servitude" is meant by language exempting servitude as pun-
ishment for a crime).
158. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 72 (describing Thirteenth Amendment's
applicability).
Undoubtedly while negro slavery alone was in the mind of the Congress which pro-
posed the thirteenth article, it forbids any other kind of slavery, now or hereafter. If
Mexican peonage or the Chinese coolie labor system shall develop slavery of the Mex-
ican or Chinese race within our territory, this amendment may safely be trusted to
make it void.
Id.
159. Complaint, supra note 20, at 17; see also VORENBERG, supra note 137, at 241
(discussing use of Thirteenth Amendment to combat peonage). Congress used the Thir-
teenth Amendment to pass an antipeonage statute in 1867, which "prohibited any law or
private contract allowing employers to render debtors into forced laborers." Id. Unfortu-
nately, the statute suffered from lack of enforcement and peonage remained a prominent
practice in the South in the early 900s. Id. Despite its moderate success in regulating
peonage, the Thirteenth Amendment's prohibition on "involuntary servitude" "failed to
become a constitutional bedrock for the rights of labor." Id.
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its protections have never been granted to anything other than human
beings.' 60
Under Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Congress has the
power, as interpreted by The Supreme Court, "to pass all laws necessary
and property for abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the
United States."1 6' The badges and incidents of slavery have generally
been defined as the lack of the right to "make and enforce contracts, to
sue, be parties, and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold,
and convey real and personal property . . . as is enjoyed by white citi-
zens." 162 Therefore, if an animal is to have redress under the Thirteenth
Amendment, it would have to allege that it was entitled to and denied
one of the aforementioned rights that have been traditionally unique to
human beings. This is highly unlikely, especially because modern federal
statutes passed by Congress addressing the treatment of animals, such as
the Marine Mammal Protection Act (MMPA), still permit certain groups
to "take" or capture wild animals for specific purposes."'
Despite claims by animal rights groups that extending the reach of the
Thirteenth Amendment to animals would be a natural expansion of pro-
tections to a new group, courts would be taking an unprecedented step
that would cause havoc on other areas of law.'" If human ownership of
160. See Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 25 (1944) (describing state statute that vio-
lated Thirteenth Amendment and Antipeonage Act concerning human beings); see also
Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219, 245 (1911) (explaining state statute that violated Thir-
teenth Amendment for peonage concerning human beings).
161. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 20 (1883).
162. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 422 (1968).
163. 16 U.S.C. § 1374(c)(1) (2006).
Any permit issued by the Secretary which authorizes the taking or importation of a
marine mammal for purposes of scientific research, public display, or enhancing the
survival or recovery of a species or stock shall specify, in addition to the conditions
required by subsection (b) of this section, the methods of capture, supervision, care,
and transportation which must be observed pursuant to such taking or importation.
Any person authorized to take or import a marine mammal for purposes of scientific
research, public display, or enhancing the survival or recovery of a species or stock
shall furnish to the Secretary a report on all activities carried out by him pursuant to
that authority.
Id.
164. Compare Complaint, supra note 20, at 18 (describing extension of Thirteenth
Amendment protections to animals as within the court's interpretative power), with
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 72 (1872) (holding involuntary servitude only applies to
humans). The Supreme Court would have to overrule existing precedent if it decided to
grant animals Thirteenth Amendment protections.
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animals were to be viewed as "slavery," the long-standing principles of
property law would be systematically altered.6 s
Additionally, including animals within the definition of "slavery" and
"involuntary servitude" would result in a myriad of unintended conse-
quences.16 6 For example, every human who owned a pet dog or cat
would be viewed as a slaveholder. Given the Court's history of refusing
to broadly interpret the Thirteenth Amendment, coupled with the disas-
trous results that would ensue if animals were considered "slaves," the
court should continue to adopt a conservation approach in interpreting
the scope of the Thirteenth Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The exploitation of animals is a serious problem in today's society. In
an attempt to combat this issue, state and federal animal welfare laws aim
to prevent unnecessary cruelty to animals. While animal rights propo-
nents would argue that such laws do too little in the fight against animal
cruelty, anti-cruelty statutes are the most effective and realistic way to
protect animals. The alternative, adopting an animal rights approach that
would prevent humans from using animals for any purpose, would shake
society to its core. Imagine a world where scientists weren't able to test a
potentially lifesaving cancer drug because the government decided that
protecting the life of a laboratory rat was more important than curing
childhood leukemia. While the majority of Americans support prevent-
ing unnecessary cruelty to animals, it is unlikely that they would be will-
ing to adopt a vegan lifestyle to protect their furry friends. As such, in
today's society the most realistic way to combat animal cruelty is through
the enforcement of animal welfare laws.
In the unlikely event that society decided to stop using animals as their
resource and grant animals their own rights, the Thirteenth Amendment
to the Constitution would not be among them. Given the amendment's
historical context, drafting history, and previous judicial interpretation,
one cannot logically conclude that animals are protected from slavery and
involuntary servitude under Thirteenth Amendment. To presume other-
wise is an insult to the purpose of the Thirteenth Amendment and the
165. See FAVRE, supra note 33 (explaining that existing status of animals is property);
see also Motion, supra note 129, at 17 (explaining consequences of defining slavery to in-
clude animals). It states in part, "[t]o [] expand the definition of 'slavery' under the Thir-
teenth Amendment to include the possession of animals would not constitute a natural
extension of existing civil rights law, but rather would nullify a millennia of common and
civil law defining animals as property." Id.
166. See Motion, supra note 129, at 19 (explaining constitutional rights for animals
will lead to Pandora's box of unintended consequences).
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struggle that came with its passage. While PETA's attempt to protect
animals through the Thirteenth Amendment was certainly creative, it was
severely ill-informed.
